Vertical separation vs. independent downstream entry in an electricity network: Experimental insights by Ciarreta, Aitor et al.
1 
 
 
Vertical separation vs. independent downstream entry in 
an electricity network: Experimental insights# 
 
Aitor Ciarreta 
Dpt. of Economic Analysis, University of the Basque Country, BETS and BRiDGE 
Enrique Fatas 
University of East Anglia 
Nikolaos Georgantzís 
University of Reading 
Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita 
Dpt. of Economic and Financial Studies and GATHER, University Miguel Hernández 
 
Abstract 
We analyze a realistic simulation of a complex electricity network. We obtain the data with a series 
of experimental sessions designed to closely replicate the Spanish Electricity Market. In the 
experiments reported here we compare the status quo with two alternative regulatory market 
structures. In one of them, labeled as vertical separation, we impose that power generating firms 
and electricity distributors operate as independent business groups. In the second, we study the 
effect of entry by independent end-suppliers. Both alternative scenarios dominate the status quo in 
terms of market efficiency, but the latter of them dominates the former. 
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1. Introduction 
Regulatory regimes in energy markets are to a large extent the consequence of a country’s 
technological development and political history. The performance of different regimes is hard to 
assess ex-ante, given that the same objective (economic efficiency) has been invoked to implement 
a plethora of different solutions. Given the complexity of energy systems and the difficulty of getting 
solid counterfactuals, policy alternatives cannot be easily compared on a purely empirical basis. As 
the numbers of natural experiments is limited, the empirical analysis of regime changes in energy 
markets typically follows an ex-post basis.1 Real-world data include little if any information on 
alternative scenarios. Moreover, firms are averse to changes in regulation that affect the type and 
number of potential competitors.2  
The natural alternative is theoretical analysis. Models based on abstract settings, reduced 
complexity and, in the best of the cases, simple dynamics sacrifice realism to gain analytical 
tractability. Theoretical predictions are most of the times neither immediately testable nor 
applicable. In this paper we explore an alternative method: laboratory experiments. Relative to 
other empirical methods using energy market data, experiments enjoys a superior control over the 
data generating process. While data on alternative regulatory regimes is difficult to obtain in the 
field, experiments may challenge almost any status quo with several alternative counterfactuals. 
The external validity of the experimental results is stressed by focusing on comparative statics (how 
behavior changes when the regulation changes) rather than on individual behavior itself. Relative to 
its cousins, the theoretical models, we believe experiments may help the dialogue between policy-
makers, academics and practitioners with a limited but non-negligible number of intuitions about the 
viability of different solutions. Not surprisingly, different experiments have recently analyzed 
electricity markets. Ferreira et al. (2009) and Brandts et al. (2008) test the strategic scope of selling 
forward in the framework of Cournot, Supply Function competition and Multi-unit auctions settings. 
Ede et al. (2001) focus on market power abuse by generators. Our study contributes to this 
literature by analyzing a realistic experimental setting in which we study two alternative structural 
changes in the Spanish Electricity Market (SEM), hereafter. 
EU requirements to create and improve an effective electricity market in each member state 
moved governments to design more competitive regulations in European electricity sectors 
(Directive 96/92/EC). Spain is an informative example of this tendency. In Spain until 1996 there 
was no effective market to trade electricity and five companies possessed all the generation power, 
controlled transmission networks, and local distribution grids. In 1997 the organization of the 
electricity market was transformed by Law 54/1997. This law liberalized the market for electricity 
generation and introduced a spot market for electricity which started operations in January 1998.3 
OMEL (the electricity market operator, now OMIE) is the entity that manages the bidding system 
                                                 
1 Learning valid lessons from wrong policy remedies have resulted to be expensive, as the California experience and the fall 
of the English and Welsh electricity markets suggest. 
2 For instance, see Nillesen and Pollit (2011) for New Zealand. They find that ownership unbundling did not increase 
competition in the supply side although there were efficiency gains in terms of lower cost and higher quality of service. See 
also Mansur (2007) for PJM. He finds that restructuring of PJM led to anticompetitive behaviour by large net sellers, 
although vertical integration mitigates its impact. 
3 This followed liberalization in the UK electricity market and was implemented simultaneously with liberalization in 
California. 
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and the subsequent monetary transfers between agents. In 2007 both the Portuguese and Spanish 
electricity market merged operations and the Iberian market operator MIBEL was created. Since 
then, OMIE manages the Spanish Electricity Pole.4 
Despite this liberalization process, there is still a high concentration in both the generation 
and distribution sectors. Besides, larger generators act also as buyers in the pool. As a result, 
Spain’s large electricity companies are active on both sides of the wholesale electricity spot market, 
selling electricity as generators and buying it from the spot market as retailers. This feature together 
with an inelastic demand suggests that being market power still concentrated in a few firms, price-
setting behavior can be largely non competitive (see for instance Loertsche and Reisinger, 2011).5 
This is the starting hypothesis in this paper. The status quo in the SEM is a vertically integrated 
structure in which firms exert an effective and significant market power. Furthermore, we argue that 
new entrants in the retail sector or the elimination of vertically integrated firms could imply a further 
enhancement of market efficiency.   
We test these two possibilities using data obtained from a quite realistic and complex 
laboratory experiment based on the Power Market simulator6 (hereinafter, PM®) initially designed 
to replicate in the lab the demand and supply characteristics of the SEM over a combination of 
seasonal data on hydraulicity and weather conditions. The status quo is then modified to address 
two alternative market structures aimed at improving the functioning of the market. First, we 
consider a market in which generators and distributors are independent firms. Second, we 
contemplate the entry of independent distributors.  
A general perception is that vertical integration allows firms to mitigate transaction cost as 
well as some sort of asymmetric information problem arising from upstream-downstream 
contractual relations (see for instance Williamson (1971) for a classical analysis). Moreover, market 
liberalization has to consider two opposite effects of unbundling: (i) the (possible) efficiency losses 
in terms of cost of pure generation and distribution activities; (ii) the (expected) lower prices due to 
liberalization. Based on these arguments the issue of unbundling generation and distribution 
activities should take into account both pro-competitive effects and anti-competitive ones. 
The complexity of the experimental protocol described in section 3 below was our first 
challenge. In that sense, it is maybe not surprising that we were interested in learning about the 
internal validity of the method chosen. Even when our participants were more qualified than the 
standard participants used in regular experiments, the amount of information they had to process to 
make an unusually large number of round decisions was demanding. Our results strongly suggest 
that the laboratory data obtained are sensitive to the underlying experimental conditions. Prices and 
quantities follow quite reasonably the seasonal and daily demand fluctuations. Moreover, the 
                                                 
4 Before the Iberian electricity market was created in July 2007, two firms, Endesa (EN) and Iberdrola (IB) owned more than 
70 percent of the total generation capacity. After that, Electricidade de Portugal (EDP) is the third largest firm in the 
market. However, vertical integration remains in the integrated market. 
5 They find pro-competitive effects of vertical integration the larger the more concentrated the market is. Although the 
context is oligopolistic at upstream and downstream markets, that market structure is not the current situation in most of 
the electricity markets in Europe. Regulation in distribution raises incentives to increase prices. 
6 Power Market®. Examples of screen shots for decision submission and feedback are provided in Appendix 1. See also the 
experimental design in Section 3.  
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comparative statics between the alternative regulatory scenarios is quite robust to the level of 
analysis chosen. This is a positive finding regarding the validity of this instrument for policy 
recommendations in the real world.  
Our analysis of the counterfactual scenarios yields a not surprising but interesting result: both 
alternative structures lead to lower prices in the SEM. This result is interesting because it collides 
with current organization of many electricity networks. Thus, we provide evidence that supports 
unbundling of generation and distribution activities in markets with regulated distribution. Two 
features of our replication based in PM® have been neglected in previous work. First, the sector 
ability to deal with demand and supply specific uncertainty has never been analyzed in deep (e.g. 
including daily and seasonal variations). Second, the frequency with which unfavorable demand or 
supply conditions, or strategic behavior, leads to the interruption of electric energy provision. In that 
respect, our analysis helps to understand the behavioral reaction of firms to regulatory changes 
currently implemented in an increasing number of countries aiming at a more competitive price 
formation mechanism. The complexity of the experiment seeks to highlight some of the larger 
likelihood of market power abuse in vertically integrated markets. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two reviews the literature on electricity markets 
focusing on the issue of market structure. Section three describes the experimental design whereas 
Section four and five present the main results and conclusions, respectively. An appendix offers 
additional information on the PM® software.  
 
2. Literature review 
Following the prerequisites proposed by Haas and Auer (2006), the restructuring of the 
electricity sector should be based on two general types of measures: those affecting the market 
functioning and those aimed at changes in the market structure and, specifically, the separation 
between generation and distribution activities.  
Most of the research on the first measure deals with specific rules mitigating market power 
in wholesale electricity markets organized as pools. Among that type of literature, a number of 
papers used experimental frameworks to highlight pros and cons of those that affects market 
functioning. Kiesling and Wilson (2007) examine a class of Automatic Mitigation Procedures 
(AMPs) on prices and capacity investment choices in the presence of market power. Whereas long-
run prices are driven by investment in new capacity, the class of AMPs studied does not affect 
investment on capacity. Shawhan et al. (2011) run an experiment in order to test the effects of 
AMPs in suppressing the exercise of market power. They replicate the market conditions of the 
New York Independent System Operator and find that AMP keeps market prices close to marginal 
cost only when generators of electricity have low market power in uncongested periods.  
Several authors have studied the performance of firms involved in the generation and 
distribution of electricity in Spain. There is a wide consensus on the risks of the market clearing 
mechanism used, as it may facilitate collusion. Fabra and co-authors (Fabra, 2003; Fabra et al. 
2006a; Fabra and Toro, 2006b) argue that the auction used to clear the market increases the ability 
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of firms to sustain over-competitive prices. Ciarreta and Gutiérrez-Hita (2006), Ciarreta and 
Espinosa (2009), and Marin and Garcia-Diaz (2003) reach similar conclusions. 
In this paper we focus in the second type of measures mentioned above; namely, changes 
in the market structure. Green (1996) pioneered the study of competition in electricity spot markets. 
His analysis of the British market delivers a clear recommendation: partial divestiture may decrease 
the deadweight loss. Moreover, encouraging competitive entry may reduce welfare.7 Some 
empirical studies8 have already addressed the effects of vertical integration on market efficiency. 
The basic idea is to assess the trade-off between the saving costs obtained by vertical integration 
and the competitive effects of unbundling. Not surprisingly, the net effect critically depends on the 
number of upstream and downstream competitors. An extensive revision of this empirical literature 
can be found in Sionshiasi (2008). The collection of case studies included in this paper suggests 
that market reforms may lead to undesirable consequences for end-consumers when the market 
power retained by firms is high. 
While the analysis of market entry has received less attention, the joint effect of vertical 
disintegration and entry has never been studied in a systematic way in the laboratory. Rassenti et 
al. (2003) find that demand-side bidding completely neutralizes the exercise of market power.9 In 
this paper, we focus on two structural market changes. The first one breaks the vertical links 
between generators and distributors of electricity; the second allows the entry of independent firms 
in the distribution of electricity. Given the dynamic and complex nature of the market, none of these 
two types of changes is expected to cause trivially predictable results.  
Rather than simplifying the features of the industry, we choose to replicate them in the lab. 
Our experimental markets are affected by demand and supply dynamics, weather uncertainty, and 
technological asymmetries associated with firms’ generation plant configurations. Only a few 
studies have independently considered some of these issues. Arocena et al. (1999) present a 
survey focused on the SEM. Agosti et al (2007) measure its static and dynamic efficiency and 
Ciarreta and Espinosa (2010) find evidence of how market conditions affect the exercise of market 
power by larger generators. Without underestimating these alternative approaches, largely based 
on abstract setups of reduced complexity, we see the experiment reported here as a 
complementary, but necessary step towards a better understanding of the effect of daily and 
seasonal fluctuations on demand, supply and market outcomes. 
In this paper we emphasize the role that complexity, uncertainty and dynamic 
considerations play in the functioning of markets. Our experiment takes us as close as one can 
                                                 
7 A general modeling approach can be found in Newbery (1999) and Stoft (2000). These articles focus on market design and 
the effects that privatization and regulation rules have on such markets. 
8 See for example, Kwoka (2002) who looks at alternative vertical structures in the US electric market. 
9 Rassenti and Smith (2008) is an insightful revision of experimental designs on the functioning of wholesale electricity 
markets. Staropoli and Jullien (2006) also revise the contribution of laboratory experiments up to this date to understand the 
functioning of wholesale electricity markets. They focus in the market architecture but also ancillary rules to argue that 
complementary approaches to auction theory are very useful to regulator authorities to improve market efficiency. In 
particular, experimental economics reveals as a useful framework to simulate alternative scenarios. 
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realistically imagine to the real world case. In addition to the control gained in the laboratory, we 
see the realism of PM® software as an important value added of our approach.  
 
3. Methodology and Experimental Design  
The Experimental Economics Laboratories of Valencia (LINEEX, http://www.uv.es/lineex) 
and Castellón (LEE, http://www.lee.uji.es) possess a unique experimental environment which was 
constructed, following electric engineers’ advice, to simulate the exact supply and demand 
conditions (including weather variations and both daily and seasonal demand fluctuations) 
experienced by generators and distributors in the Spanish wholesale electric market. Accordingly, 
experimental subjects’ interface has been developed in a way which reflects the electricity 
technology mix specifications as well as those capacities and restrictions faced by generator firms. 
The result of this effort has been materialized in the aforementioned experimental software PM® 
which is joint intellectual property of the two laboratories. The market-clearing mechanism 
implemented resembles all the details of the bidding system adopted in the Spanish wholesale 
electricity market. The market operator OMIEL (Iberian electricity market operator) constructs with 
the selling and the purchasing bids an aggregate supply and an aggregate demand schedule, 
respectively. In a session of the daily market, it combines these offers matching demand and supply 
for each of the 24 hours and determines the equilibrium price for each period, the System Marginal 
Price (SMP), and the amount traded, the Market Clearing Quantity (MCQ). The SMP at each hour 
is determined under a uniform-price auction where the price sale offer is made by the last 
generation unit whose entry into the system was required to meet demand for electricity. Daily 
demand fluctuations produce prices which follow the usual pattern: “Extreme Peak” prices are 
higher than “Peak” prices, the latter are higher than “Semi-valley” prices which are higher than 
“Valley” prices.  
As it is usual, a first set of sessions was run to make the experimental subjects familiar with 
market rules as well as to ensure that they behave in an economically meaningful way which 
reproduces the current situation of the market. 
As mentioned above, the experiment whose results are analyzed here is based on a three-
treatment design aimed at studying two alternative scenarios concerning the future of the industry. 
Results from both alternative treatments are compared to the Treatment 1 (T1 hereinafter) 
representing the status quo of the sector. T1 is based on sessions which implement an industry 
structure which closely replicates the current status of the IM. The two alternative treatments are 
inspired on the recommendations by several authors favoring either vertical separation between 
generators and distributors or independent entry. In fact, the two alternative scenarios have never 
been compared to each other so far. In Treatment 2 (T2 hereinafter) we implement a market 
structure in which producers and distributors of electricity are independent entities. In Treatment 3 
(T3 hereinafter) we consider a more competitive distribution with a number of small but independent 
firms entering the downstream distribution market. 
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In all our treatments we captured the essence of the market dynamics by focusing on the four 
common price auctions that generate electricity prices in Spain. As our main scope is to analyze the 
effects on market prices caused by the introduction of competition in the bidding system generators 
were chosen by human subjects whereas the technological side of production was simulated 
according to the data on Spanish generator firms. Final demand conditions were also simulated 
using data from the Spanish electricity market. In T1 every market included ten firms. Half of them 
sell electricity to the market whereas the remaining five distribute electricity to final consumers. 
Table 1 summarizes the main features of the other two treatments relative to our baseline. 
TABLE 1. Experimental Design 
 T1 T2 T3 
# of producers 5 5 5 
# of sellers 5 5 7 
Vertical teams Yes No Yes 
# of markets 5 5 5 
# of sessions 1 1 1 
 
In T1 all participants participated in teams made up of one generator and one distributor. 
Earnings were equally divided among each team’s members at the end of the experiment. In the 
other two experimental treatments, as competition was introduced by breaking the vertical linkages 
between firms, subjects were paid on a purely individual basis. We used a between-subject design, 
as each participant faced only one environment and one condition. Participants were assigned to 
one market side at random and played a finitely repeated (32 rounds) game with fixed roles. 
Rounds reproduced the seasonal conditions of demand and production by a sequence of seasons. 
Sessions were run at the LINEEX computer lab of the University of Valencia. We gathered 
data from fifty (sixty in T3) firms for each treatment, grouped in five markets. Every treatment was 
run in a single session as the number of available computers in LINEEX’s main room is 64. 
Subjects were recruited among the graduate and undergraduate student population of the 
University of Valencia and the graduate population at the Technical University of Valencia. In the 
former, we recruited among economics and business graduate and undergraduate students with at 
least intermediate knowledge of industrial organization. In the latter, only graduate students from 
the School of Industrial Engineers were allowed to participate in the experiment. The recruitment 
procedures were the standard ones in Valencia. Students received an e-mail message announcing 
sessions. Subjects were only allowed to participate in a single session.  
At the beginning of each session the experimenter read aloud the instructions and subjects 
asked as many questions as they wish. All questions were answered publicly by the experimenter. 
Before beginning to play, all subjects were asked to complete a short quiz on the payoffs and the 
rules of the experiment.10 
Subjects knew in advance that there would be a total of 32 rounds and that the demand 
condition would change depending on seasonal market conditions. The cost of a power supply 
                                                 
10 The full text for the instructions and quiz are available from the authors upon request. 
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interruption was also known in advance. Table 2 describes weather conditions, hydraulicity and 
daily phases by each period. 
Table 2. Weather, hydraulicity and daily phases by period (1-32) 
Year 1, 
Period  
Season 
(conditions) 
Daily 
phase  
Year 2, 
Period 
Season 
(conditions) 
Daily 
phase 
1 Winter 
(D, N) 
1, v  17 Winter 
(H, N) 
17, v 
2 Winter 
(D, N) 
2, s  18 Winter 
(H, N) 
18, s 
3 Winter 
(D, C) 
3, p  19 Winter 
(H, C) 
19, p 
4 Winter 
(D, N) 
4, e  20 Winter 
(H, N) 
20, e 
5 Spring 
(H, N) 
5, v  21 Spring 
(H, N) 
21, v 
6 Spring 
(H, N) 
6, s  22 Spring 
(H, N) 
22, s 
7 Spring 
(H, N) 
7, p  23 Spring 
(H, N) 
23, p 
8 Spring 
(H, N) 
8, e  24 Spring 
(H, N) 
24, e 
9 Summer 
(D, N) 
9, v  25 Summer 
(D, N) 
25, v 
10 Summer 
(D, N) 
10, s  26 Summer 
(D, N) 
26, s 
11 Summer 
(D, H) 
11, p  27 Summer 
(D, H) 
27, p 
12 Summer 
(D, N) 
12, e  28 Summer 
(D, N) 
28, e 
13 Autumn 
(D, N) 
13, v  29 Autumn 
(D, N) 
29, v 
14 Autumn 
(D, N) 
14, s  30 Autumn 
(D, N) 
30, s 
15 Autumn 
(D, N) 
15, p  31 Autumn 
(D, N) 
31, p 
16 Autumn 
(D, N) 
16, e  32 Autumn 
(D, N) 
32, e 
Hydraulic Conditions: (D, H) = (Dry, Humid), Weather Conditions: (C, H) = (Cold, Hot). 
Daily phases: v=Valley; s=Semi-valley; p=Peak; e=Extreme Peak. 
 
Rather than using abstract terminology we employ a rather naturalistic corporate context. 
For example, generator firms were explicitly referred to as “producers” and distributor firms as 
“sellers”. They were told to run a “firm” (or being part of a holding of firms in T1). We avoided the 
use of terms with what we considered strong connotations. For example, when being part of a 
team, subjects were not asked to cooperate (or fight) between them. They had no information about 
the rest of the treatments run in the experiment and we did our best to minimize contamination from 
information conveyed between subjects participating in different sessions, although we believe that 
this was not a major issue due to the complexity of our design.  
The instructions stressed their individual roles in the experiment. Moreover, the meaning of 
bids and offers was carefully explained to them as well as the relevance of seasonality and 
production technologies. For experimenters who are used to worrying about repeated game effects, 
the use of fixed groups may seem like a strange design choice. However, the field settings that we 
are interested in simulating involve repeated interactions among the same agents. Repeated game 
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effects and history dependence are presumably quite natural in these settings. In fact, in the SEM 
generator and distributor firms have access to market results with 24 hours delay.11 
In each round all participants had to simultaneously submit their bids and offers for 
electricity. The screen on which subjects made their decisions displayed information about 
production costs (final demand) for generators (distributors). The PM® software was developed 
from scratch using Java language. Figures 9 and 10 in the Appendix 1 are screen shots from this 
software. Both figures show the complex information available to subjects before and after they 
made their decisions. Once their bids and offers were submitted, the software computed demand 
and supply functions and the four market prices. Firm’s payoffs were computed according to each 
firm buyer (seller) constraints. Figure 1 shows a sample output of the information shown to each 
participant after the market clearance (1.a) and a real screen shot fitted by the Spanish Market 
operator OMEL (1.b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Market clearance at the experiment and a real OMIE market result. 
 
Separate windows on the feedback screen showed firms’ results for each market at the 
aggregate level. In all rounds, subjects had full information about their own costs and profits, and 
market prices coming from each demand profile. Information about the profit level of all other 
participants remained unknown to them. Moreover, they had no information from other markets in 
the same session. 
At the end of the session, each subject was paid in cash for all rounds played plus a show-
up fee of five Euros. Payments took place on an individual and private basis. Recall that all payoffs 
are in "ECUs" (experimental currency units) which were converted to Euros. The average total 
payoff was 95.29€ and the average session lasted about 150 minutes (another 60 minutes were 
used to explain the instructions and run the quiz). These earnings were sufficiently large to 
generate a good supply of subjects and compensate them for such a long instruction and play time. 
 
                                                 
11 At the web page of the market operator OMEL (www.omelholding.es) market results are available for anyone visiting the 
site. 
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4. Results 
 In this section, we present the results obtained from the experimental framework described 
above. We run 17 independent experimental markets: 6 under T1, 6 under T2 and 5 under T3. In 
the following Subsection 3.1 we proceed with the descriptive analysis. The discussion is based on 
the evolution of price averages by period over 32 periods, as illustrated in Figures 2 to 8. In 
particular, Figures 2 to 4 are constructed to compare for each treatment price averages across the 
four different demand daily phases. Figures 5 to 8 describe differences for each demand daily 
phase across treatments.  
In Subsection 3.2 we perform a formal statistical and econometric analysis.  A Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
(KS) equality-of-distribution test and a Differences-in-Differences econometrical approach are 
conducted to test the robustness of the results. 
 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and figures 
 
We first focus on the effect that the two market organization alternatives have on price averages by 
demand daily phases. This is done for each treatment. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 3. 
We also plotted the path of price averages across periods in Figures 2 to 4. These comparisons are 
intended to test the consistency of our experimental results. Thus, one would expect that the price 
averages of electricity at valley hours is lower than the price at semi-valley hours, which in turn 
should be lower than the price at peak hours, and finally this should be lower than the price at 
extreme peak hours. Summary statistics are presented in Table 3 (standard deviations in 
parentheses) to show how results are consistent with how players were expected to behave. We 
separate information by treatment and demand profile. Figures 2 to 4 plot price averages by 
periods. 
 
Generally speaking, both our working hypotheses receive some support by our data, as can 
be seen in each one of the Figures 2 to 4. However, Table 3 reveals that if we concentrate on the 
differences between “Semi-Valley” and “Peak” prices, we see that the aforementioned general 
picture becomes less clear and the inverse ranking than that implied by our hypotheses is obtained 
in some cases. On the contrary, “Extreme Peak” and “Valley” prices are, respectively, the highest 
and the lowest in all periods of the experiment in all treatments, which implies a strong confirmation 
of the hypothesis that our design yields meaningful responses to the implemented daily fluctuations 
of demand.  
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As shown in Table 3, on average, valley prices are the highest under T1 with no mean 
differences between semi-valley and peak prices under T1 and T2. Thus, introducing unbundling 
between upstream and downstream activities does not seem to be the most efficient way of 
enhancing competition. When more independent distributors are allowed to operate in the market, 
the results change. An increase in downstream competition has a pro-competitive effect not only 
during valleys, but also guarantees lower prices also during semi-valley, peak and extreme peak 
hours. 
Let us have a more detailed look at these insights from Figures 2 to 4. A main feature 
across the three treatments is that experimental subjects behave more competitively after exactly 5 
rounds, whatever the demand profile considered. This is consistent with most of the experiments on 
oligopolistic markets where individuals take some rounds in order to learn how the market works. 
The fact that some subjects earn almost zero profits induce a more competitive behavior that yields 
lower prices after one or two rounds of high prices. 
T2 reveals that unbundling per se does not necessarily enhance competition. In fact, only 
average prices for extreme peak and valley are clearly lower than in T1. For peak and semi-valley 
demand profiles average prices are quite similar. The reason is that experimental subjects tacitly 
coordinate their bidding behavior to some extent. This observation resembles the situation in the 
TABLE 3 Average prices by treatment 
 T1 T2 T3 
pv 339.8 (51.3) 
311.6 
(51.4) 
311.4 
(57) 
ps 353 (48.8) 
353.9 
(39.2) 
334.2 
(59.1) 
pp 366 (57.4) 
361.5 
(37.5) 
341 
(63.5) 
pe 397 (44.3) 
386.2 
(44.5) 
369.5 
(68.8) 
27
5
32
5
37
5
42
5
47
5
52
5
57
5
ec
u
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
Period
pv2: Average price for Valley ps2: Average price for Semivalley
pp2: Average price for Peak pe2: Average price for Extreme-Peak
FIGURE 3: Evolution of price averages for the four daily phases  in Treatment 2
Average price by period, T2
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FIGURE 4: Evolution of price averages for the four daily phases  in Treatment 3
Average price by period, T3
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FIGURE 2: Evolution of price averages for the four daily phases in Treatment 1
Average price by period, T1
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SEM, where unbundling generation and distribution activities does not yield a more competitive 
behavior in the pool. 
 
An increase of competitors on the demand side of electricity markets organized as pools 
has been a recommendation of the European Competition Authorities for all country members since 
late 90’s. We deal with this scenario in T3. Overall, we find that T3 is more competitive than T1 and 
T2. Indeed, for each demand profile price averages are lower than in the other treatments but also 
the variability is reduced. Moreover, differences across different demand profiles are minimized. 
This is because downstream competition induces a more aggressive bidding in order to catch 
demand. This behavior also has a pro-competitive effect on the generators’ bidding behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 5 to 8 compare price averages across treatments for each demand profile. Concerning 
Valley prices, Figure 5 indicates that both vertical separation (T2) and independent entry (T3) in the 
market for electricity distribution would reduce prices as compared to the status quo (T1). However, 
at a first glance it is not clear which of the alternative treatments yields lower prices. This can be 
due to the fact that the amount of energy traded is small so that T2 and T3 do not provide sufficient 
evidence of competitive improvements. That is, as long as a small amount of energy is traded, the 
opportunity of increasing revenues by bidding more aggressively is reduced. Thus, although prices 
are lower than in T1, the competitive effects of unbundling (T2) and increasing downstream 
competition (T3) are very mall. 
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FIGURE 5: Evolution of 'Valley'  price averages for the three treatments
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FIGURE 6: Evolution of Semivalley price averages for the three treatments
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Regarding the prices of the Semi-Valley phase, Figure 6 suggests that the two alternative 
market structures proposed here have a moderate effect on prices as compared to T1. More 
specifically, only T3, the independent entry alternative, seems to have a clear effect on prices. In 
this case, prices are systematically, although moderately, lower than in the other two treatments. 
On the contrary, vertical separation is not found to have any clear competition-enhancing effect on 
the prices of this demand phase. Figure 7 indicates a similar pattern for Peak prices. Independent 
entry in the distribution of electricity lowers prices, but less than in the case of what was found in 
the case of the Semi-Valley phase. Like in the previous case, vertical separation leads to prices 
which are not significantly different from those obtained in the baseline treatment for the same 
demand phase. Figure 8 reveals that in the case of Extreme-Peak hours T3 yields to lower prices. 
  
Therefore, our results indicate that both structural changes considered here would lead to 
lower prices for electric energy. However, independent entry into the market of electric energy 
distribution is found to be systematically more effective than vertical separation. Another interesting 
aspect of our results relates with a key feature which has not been studied so far, but constitutes a 
central concern of policy makers regarding the function of the electricity market. Indeed, our data 
contains information on seasonality, hydroelectric resources, temperature and availability of new 
technologies.12 The effects of these variables on prices are tested. 
  
If the weather is dry, hydroelectric generation cannot be used to cover base load demand 
because the opportunity cost of water usage is very high. Therefore, generation comes from fossil 
fuels, which have a higher variable cost. Interestingly, cold waves are more price-rocketing than 
heat waves. The shape of the demand curve may be the reason of this behavior. We may observe 
more electricity is consumed during cold waves (heating) than during heat waves (cooling). Once 
again learning makes a difference during extreme peak hours under T2 and during cold waves. 
 
Finally, we can observe a phenomenon which has not been reported elsewhere so far. 
Note that the entry of new firms in the market for electricity market distribution increases the 
incentives of both downstream and upstream agents to use supply interruptions as a strategic 
weapon signaling their bargaining strength. However, interestingly, the vertical separation treatment 
(in which producers and distributors of electricity are independent from each other) yields the lowest 
number of supply interruptions, which indicates that it is the presence of vertical relations among 
incumbents that triggers the “interruption wars” reported here. 
  
                                                 
12 Tables 6 to 8 in Appendix 3 report prices and standard deviations for hydraulicity, temperature, and seasonality, 
respectively. 
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4.2. Statistical and econometric analysis  
In order to test the robustness of the results presented in the previous subsection we conduct here 
a statistical and econometric analysis of the experimental data. We first report the results from a 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) equality-of-distribution test in order to highlight the significance of 
distributional differences across treatments. This test is based on comparisons between pairs of 
distributions. The directional hypotheses are evaluated with the statistics 
 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }xPxPminKSandxPxPmaxKS kh
x
kh
x
−=−= −+ , 
 
where Ph(x) and Pk(x) are the empirical distribution functions for the two sample groups 
respectively, h,k=1,2,3 and h�k. The combined statistic is simply 
 
( )−+= KSKSKS ,max .13 
 
We first do a Kernel density plot of prices by treatment. Results of the test are reported in Table 4. It 
is apparent that prices across treatments do not have the same distribution. Thus, the null 
hypothesis of equality of the distributions of prices under different treatments is rejected. As a 
result, it seems reasonable that the characteristics of each treatment have a non negligible impact 
on the prices observed. 
 
TABLE 4.- KS test for equality of distribution functions results 
 TR1 and TR2 TR1 and TR3 TR2 and TR3 
 KS p-value KS p-value KS p-value 
pv 0.4000 0.000*** 0.5247 0.000*** 0.1747 0.012** 
ps 0.2188 0.001*** 0.3979 0.000*** 0.4016 0.000*** 
pp 0.3312 0.000*** 0.4346 0.000*** 0.4784 0.000*** 
pe 0.2437 0.000*** 0.4413 0.000*** 0.3553 0.000*** 
p 0.2375 0.000*** 0.3890 0.000*** 0.3073 0.000*** 
 
 
                                                 
13 The p-value for KS is obtained using the asymptotic limiting distribution. Let m and n be the sample sizes for each group. 
Then, Smirnov (1939) shows that 
( )
( ) ( )∑∞
=
−
−
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Second, we test some hypotheses on the effects of the treatments on valley, semi-valley, 
peak and extreme-peak prices under the three different scenarios of weather forecast and 
seasonality. As experimental subjects have been working under a vertically-integrated market 
structure, a vertically-separated market structure, and facing new entrants on the demand side of 
the market, we have three different groups which are affected by several exogenous 
characteristics. 
We consider a Differences-in-Differences approach (DiD hereinafter) to measure the effect 
of the treatments on market results.14 In our case, DiD is an econometric technique whose basic 
premise is to examine the effect of a treatment by comparison with the control treatment group. The 
approach assumes that all other factors affected identically both groups under comparison. For it to 
provide consistent estimations, we must assume that the two groups do not change over the course 
of the treatment. Thus, in our experiment these conditions hold, since all the factors that affect 
generators and distributors are not dependent on the treatment under study. Besides, subjects are 
the same during the course of the experiment. 
 
We take T1 as our control group. The coefficient of the interaction variable for T2 (TR2) is � 
and for T3 (TR3) is �. The following regression equation where the endogenous variable is the price 
Pt has been run, 
𝑃𝑃 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝜃𝜃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2,𝑡𝑡 + TR3,t + 𝛼𝛼1𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝑍𝑍𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡     [1] 
where D is a dummy vector that controls for within-day variations in demand, S is a dummy vector 
that controls for seasonal variations (winter, spring, summer and autumn) and Z is a dummy vector 
that controls for weather conditions (normal, cold-wave and heat-wave).15 
Once we control for seasonal as well as daily variations, any difference in market results 
can be attributed to variations in the strategic bidding behavior after the new market structure is in 
place (namely from T1 to T2 and from T1 to T3). The error term contains all the demand and supply 
shocks that are uncorrelated with regressors. Thus, if �<0 (>0) prices under T2 are significantly 
lower (higher) than those under the status quo after controlling for common factors such as demand 
fluctuations and considering unexpected shocks that cannot be anticipated by market operators. 
Whereas, if �<0 (>0), prices under T3 are significantly lower (higher) than those under the status 
quo. Finally, the difference between treatments can be estimated through the difference in the 
parameters, � - �. 
Estimation results are reported in Table 5. The base group corresponds to extreme prices 
under T1 in autumn, with dry weather and heat-wave. Moreover, estimation results are not sensitive 
to this choice. In viewing Table 5 it is observed that the DiD analysis confirms the statistical analysis 
preceding this section. Prices under T2 and T3 are significantly lower as compared to the baseline 
                                                 
14 See Ashenfelter and Card (1985) for early work on this type of estimation and Abadie (2005) for extensions. 
15 In Appendix 3 we show how indeed � and � are the coefficients of interest to measure differences in market structure. 
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at T1. Besides, the difference between T2 and T3 measured by � - � is equal to -14.96 and it is also 
significant. Thus, our results show how allowing entry of new distributors in the market without 
breaking the vertical structure of the system would be sufficient to yield lower prices in the market. 
 
TABLE 5.- DiD in prices 
� -10.64*** 
� -24.90*** 
Valley -63.32*** 
Semi-valley -37.20*** 
Peak -28.03*** 
Winter 46.12*** 
Spring 49.52*** 
Summer -6.03 
Humid -62.69*** 
Normal -6.21 
Cold-wave 9.45 
Constant 369.88*** 
R2 0.4991 
F(8,1895) 41.15*** 
*** Significant at 1% level 
  
Generally speaking, these estimations provide a rigorous test confirming the findings reported in the 
previous section. Furthermore, it is confirmed that our experimental setting leads previously 
uninformed subjects to actions which induce quite realistic market outcomes reflecting what would 
have been expected to happen under each type of consumption time and each specific weather 
condition. An additional finding is that weather conditions have a stronger and statistically 
significant effect on output than prices. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 Many experts have suggested restructuring the SEM. However, due to the complexity of the 
market, textbook industrial organization tells us little on the direction that such restructuring should 
follow. Even sophisticated theoretical models systematically fail to address a number of central 
features of the real-world case under study. Furthermore, given the fact that historical data cannot 
be used to infer anything on the effects of a given structural change, empirical research would also 
fail to address the issue of what we should expect to observe following a change in the current 
structure of the market.  
 We have reported here results from a series of experiments designed to address the effects 
of two alternative structural changes: vertical separation of corporations which are active on both 
17 
 
sides of the market (generation and distribution) and independent entry of firms in the market of 
electric energy distribution. 
 Our results indicate that both measures would lead to lower prices, although independent 
entry in the distribution sector would yield more significant price decreases. However, this is 
achieved at some cost, as it would increase the number of supply interruptions. Breaking the 
vertical links between producers and distributors would lead to much more moderate price 
decreases, but this would be combined by a decrease in the number of supply interruptions. 
Policy makers need to be assisted by research instruments and methodologies which are 
appropriate for addressing some central features of the real world market under study, like demand 
fluctuations, production and demand-side asymmetries and exercise of market power through 
implicit recognition of strategic interdependences. Such objectives are more likely to be achieved by 
appropriately designed and conducted laboratory experiments with more realistic and, thus, 
complex settings, of which this is a first attempt.  
Hopefully, our results will contribute to fill the gap between theoretical results based mainly 
on simple, abstract, symmetric setups and a complex reality with asymmetric producers and 
distributors facing a complex and uncertain economic system of supply and demand conditions. 
 
  
18 
 
APPENDIX 1: Software interface. 
 
Figure 9: Strategy-submission and feedback interface for a distributor. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Strategy-submission and feedback interface for a producer. 
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APPENDIX 2: Differences-in-differences procedure. 
The DiD approach consists of the following procedure. Estimate the regression equation [1] 
using Ordinary Least Squares. By calculating the following expected prices 
𝐸𝐸(𝑃𝑃/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2 = 1,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇3 = 0) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝜃𝜃 + 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛼𝛼3, 
𝐸𝐸(𝑃𝑃/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2 = 0,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇3 = 1) = 𝛼𝛼0 +  + 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛼𝛼3, 
𝐸𝐸(𝑃𝑃/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2 = 0,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇3 = 0) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 + 𝛼𝛼2 + 𝛼𝛼3, 
the DiD consists of subtracting expected prices under the status quo (T1) from those under each 
alternative treatment (T2 and T3), 
𝐸𝐸(𝑃𝑃/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2 = 1,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇3 = 0) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑃𝑃/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2 = 0,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇3 = 0) = , 
𝐸𝐸(𝑃𝑃/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2 = 0,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇3 = 1) − 𝐸𝐸(𝑃𝑃/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇2 = 0,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇3 = 0) = . 
As a result, it is easy to show how differences between treatments are just � - �. 
APPENDIX 3: Average prices by hydraulicity, temperature, and seasonality. 
 
TABLE 6. Average prices by hydraulicity and demand profile. 
 T1 T2 T3 
Dry pv 342.6 
(48.9) 
315.5 
(50.8) 
321.4 
(59.1) 
ps 359.8 
(45.9) 
360.6 
(36.2) 
347.6 
(62) 
pp 369.7 
(58.8) 
369.3 
(35.1) 
353.5 
(70.5) 
pe 402.8 
(41.4) 
393.4 
(47.2) 
386.3 
(73.9) 
Humid pv 335.2 
(55.1) 
305 
(52.1) 
295.5 
(49.6) 
ps 341.5 
(51.6) 
342.7 
(41.6) 
312.8 
(47) 
pp 359.8 
(54.8) 
348.5 
(38) 
321 
(44) 
pe 387.1 
(47.4) 
374 
(36.8) 
342.7 
(49.4) 
 
 
Table 6 summarizes results considering periods of dry versus humid climate. If the weather is dry it 
means hydroelectric generation cannot be used to cover demand because the opportunity cost of 
water usage is very high. Therefore, generation comes from fossil fuels, which have a higher 
variable cost. As a result, the experiment shows how prices are on average higher. But, notice how 
under stage treatments 2 and 3, prices tend to converge and are actually rather high. This may 
arise as a result of learning during the bidding process.  
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Table 7. Average prices by temperature and demand profile. 
 T1 T2 T3 
Normal pv 339.1 
(52.1) 
310 
(51.5) 
309.7 
(55.2) 
ps 351.8 
(49.1) 
352.8 
(39.1) 
330.3 
(53) 
pp 364.4 
(57.1) 
359.4 
(36.2) 
337 
(57.9) 
pe 395.3 
(43.6) 
384.6 
(42.7) 
364.4 
(61.9) 
Heat 
Wave 
pv 339.3 
(51) 
312.2 
(49.7) 
298.5 
(39.7) 
ps 360.2 
(49.2) 
360.5 
(31.5) 
334.6 
(38.5) 
pp 367.2 
(54.8) 
373 
(28.3) 
336 
(49.2) 
pe 395.7 
(34.5) 
384.5 
(46) 
362.3 
(40.8) 
Cold 
Wave 
pv 350.8 
(42.8) 
332.5 
(52.8) 
348 
(83) 
ps 361.5 
(47.7) 
362.5 
(48.9) 
386.3 
(115.2) 
pp 388 
(65.5) 
380 
(57) 
401 
(111.6) 
pe 421.6 
(57.3) 
409 
(63.7) 
446 
(123.6) 
 
Table 7 presents the results under three different scenarios of weather forecast. Interestingly, cold 
waves are more prices rocketing than heat waves. The shape of the demand curve may be the 
reason of this behaviour. Once again learning makes a difference during extreme peak hours under 
treatment 2 and cold waves. 
      
TABLE 8. Average prices by season and demand profile. 
 T1 T2 T3 
Winter pv 345.5 
(45.2) 
319.5 
(55.9) 
339.1 
(69.6) 
ps 358.6 
(45.5) 
364.1 
(45) 
361.7 
(87.4) 
pp 379.2 
(64.1) 
371.4 
(43.1) 
379.6 
(89.5) 
pe 409.9 
(55.4) 
404.7 
(52) 
412.9 
(101) 
Autumn pv 343.8 
(53.8) 
309.4 
(44.1) 
313.6 
(47.9) 
ps 359.2 
(48) 
356 
(34.9) 
333.4 
(38.7) 
pp 362.6 
(56.2) 
362.5 
(34.7) 
334.9 
(44.2) 
pe 398.1 
(36.1) 
381.4 
(37.7) 
366.3 
(55) 
Spring pv 333.5 
(57.3) 
305 
(55.1) 
292.6 
(46.3) 
ps 337.9 
(49.3) 
343.1 
(43) 
314.8 
(44.9) 
pp 358.5 
(49.7) 
348.3 
(40) 
323.7 
(47) 
pe 387.5 
(46.7) 
375.1 
(39.3) 
343.8 
(40.8) 
Summer pv 336.4 
(49) 
312.3 
(50.6) 
300.6 
(50.6) 
ps 356.2 
(50.7) 
352.5 
(30.5) 
326.8 
(40.6) 
pp 363.7 
(58.5) 
363.9 
(28.1) 
325.2 
(43.9) 
pe 392.4 
(33.9) 
383.4 
(43.6) 
354.7 
(38.1) 
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